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A COMMENT ON RACE AND THE LAW
ZANITA

E. FENTONt

I applaud The Wayne Law Review for holding its 2002 Symposium on
the topic of "Race and the Law." The social realities of race have
affected every aspect of American life in its history from personal social
relationships, the formation of community, labor and business, and
education, to name a few. Most important for the purpose of this
Symposium are the ways in which race and race relations have
influenced the development of American law.
I have the privilege of teaching a course on race and the law and
from this have had the very rich experience of teaching a wide scope of
subject areas. The subjects most expected to be covered include
Constitutional law and theory, education law, criminal law and
procedure, and employment discrimination, but we cannot leave out
family law, environmental law, local government law, immigration law,
international law of treaties, voting rights law, and First Amendment
jurisprudence. The impact of race on the core subject areas of the law
has been profound, yet it remains a struggle to find law teachers who
will explore this relationship in the classroom or even to find
discussions of race in the course materials.'
It now seems to me, having taught race and the law, that race is so
central in the development of the panoply of legal subject matter that
a course on race and the law ought to be unnecessary. Unfortunately it
is the case that we, as lawyers and law teachers, get so caught up in
reducing everything to principles and rules that we too often forget, or
in the least obscure, the greater contexts from whence the law comes.

The sterilization process that permits the absenting of race, and other
social constructions, from the core considerations in the law allows us

tAssociate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. B.A., 1990,
Princeton University; J.D., 1993, Harvard Law School. I thank the students of The
Wayne Law Retiew for choosing the topic and for their efforts in making this
Symposium a success.
1. These are my personal impressions based on informal discussions with
colleagues teaching at a variety of schools and a brief and informal survey of text
books. I have even heard many anecdotes about teachers presenting Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1994), completely divorced from race.

1061

1062

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1061

the illusion that the law is sterile, neutral, and of a higher nature.2 The
dimension of race, when accurately viewed, does not allow the actors in
the legal system to treat the law in an isolated fashion.' Considerations
of race ensure that we do not divorce law from social reality or view its
application in an aseptic vacuum. To that end, in teaching and learning
law in its fullest context to include race and other social constraints and
considerations, we must be interdisciplinary, consulting such fields as
history, political science, sociology, demography, statistical analysis, and
economic theory, to name only a few.
The panelists of this Symposium, Professors Safranek and Torres,4
seemed remarkably well-coordinated without having spoken to each
other beforehand. Professor Safranek gave us a taste of history, focusing
on some of the inconsistencies in the original Constitution and the
hypocrisies in various interpretations as the nation developed, bringing
us to the modem era. Professor Torres discussed examples of modern
issues and provided a framework for moving forward.
Professor Safranek, in his historical critique of the Constitution, its
Amendments, and the succeeding interpretations of them in the
relevant case law, is very thorough, discussing not only the (in)famous
2. Of course, I am speaking of natural law. SeeJohn M. Finnis, NaturalLaw: The
ClassicalTbeoy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
OFLAW3 Jules Coleman& Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (describing natural law as "moral

standards which ... can justify and guide political authority, make legal rules rationally
binding, and shape concept formation in even descriptive social theory"). But see
Ronald A. Dworkin, 'Natural"Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165,165 (1982) (giving
what he calls a "crude description" of natural law- "Natural law insists that what the

law is depends in some way on what the law should be"). Dworkin observes, "One
label, however, is particularly dreaded: no one wants to be called a natural lawyer." Id.
I realize many law teachers would balk at the idea of being called a natural law

theorist, but I nonetheless suggest that many of us, when we ignore the context from
whence the law developed, its purpose or its enforcement, are in fact teaching from
such a perspective.
3. It may not be clear where race is a relevant consideration, but it is preferable
that we give it too much consideration than ignore it when it may shed light on society

and law.
4. Though professor Torres did not write a piece for this Symposium issue, his
remarks were based substantially on his book co-authored with Professor Lani
Guinier. LANi GuINIER& GERALD TORRES,THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002). My remarks in this regard

are not intended to serve as a book review and only reference the parts of the book
that I remember Professor Torres discussing during the Symposium.
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cases, but also the not so well-known cases that bring greater insights
into the social and moral conflicts of their time.' For example, he
discusses the lesser known case of Pngg v. Commonwealth, a pre-Dred
Scott 6 case that demonstrates the division between the states and that
there was at least one alternative to the holding in Dred Scott.' He also
discusses B~yew v. United Statesand the Court's wasted opportunity under
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to uphold the rights of blacks to be
witnesses and to be meaningfully protected under murder statutes.'
Professor Safranek does a wonderful job of demonstrating how
historically, racial injustice has influenced actors in the justice system in
their warped interpretations and applications of law under the
Constitution. Where I may disagree with Professor Safranek is in his
assertion that "the most profound 'fights' over race in the courts and
American law are over." 9 This proposition is quite dependent on
definition. It is true that the ideological and moral conflicts were so
deeply inconsistent in the writings and in the practice and enforcement
that many would say the resolution of such conflicts, even in only the
formal writings, is profound. However, the profundity is limited to the
social change that had to occur in order to make the written and
interpretive changes. The ideological inconsistencies are fairly obvious
and in fact were understood by the framers at writing" and by judicial
5. I do not fault Professor Safranek for focusing almost exclusively on the

treatment of African Americans in his historical review. The sheer volume of material
that could be addressed within the category of race is prohibitive. It is also true that
the social history of Black Americans, especially with regards to the period and
continued effects of slavery, make their role central to an understanding of the
Constitution, of legal developments, and of American culture. Nonetheless, the blackwhite paradigm is insufficient to fully understand the development of American law.
See generaly Juan F. Perea, The Black/ White Binary Para&igmof Race: The 'NVormalScience"
ofAmerican Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997).

6. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
7. Stephen J. Safranek, Race and the Law, or How the Courts and the Law Have Been
Warped by RacialInjustice, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 1025, 1031 (2002) (discussing Pn'gg v.
Commonwealth, 41 U.S. 539 (1842)).
8. See id. at 1039-40 (discussing Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581 (1871)).
9. Id at 1059.
10. The natural law ideology of the Declaration of Independence and the
institution of slavery were profoundly contradictory. The framers compromised by
sacrificing the liberty of black slaves to preserve the union and their own property
interests. SeeJUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR
A DIVERSE AMERiCA 103-06 (2000) (citing III THE RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL
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actors throughout history, as aptly described by Professor Safranek in
his discussion of Dred Scott." I believe the most profound "fights" will
continue to occur around laws written as facially neutral that
nonetheless have a pernicious intent" or around laws that are in fact
neutral but nonetheless are enforced in differential ways. 3 Indeed, I will
CONVENTION OF 1787 at 377 (Max Farrand ed., revised ed. 1966)), which discusses
the reason the word "slave" was left out of the Constitution; Luther Martin, Genuine
Information, reprinted in III THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at
211 (Max Farrand ed., revised ed. 1966); see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Real Status of
Blacks Today: The Cbronick of Constitutional Contradiction, in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIALJUSTICE 26-42 (1987).

11. Safranek, supra note 7, at 1031-37.
12. One example is in access to housing as Martha Mahoney describes:
Racial segregation was systematically promoted during the 1930s, 1940s, and
1950s by federal programs like the Home Owners Loan Corporation
(HOLC), which made loans to homeowners, and the Federal Housing
Authority (FHA), which insured private-sector loans. These programs
refused to lend money to blacks. They also actively promoted systems of
restrictive racial covenants. The greatest impact of these federal agencies in
structuring the market, however, lay in the ranking system-the origins of
redlining-that the government used to rank communities in their eligibility
for federally-financed or federally-insured loans.
Using these guidelines, HOLC and FHA actually refused to lend money
or underwrite loans for whites if whites moved to areas where people of
color lived. Private lenders adopted policies in line with federal guidelines.
These programs reduced housing opportunities for blacks.
Martha Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Tranformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659,
1669-70 (1995) (emphasis in original) (citing CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN
NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING 174-75 (1955), KENNETH T.
JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES

190-218 (1985)); see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 42-59 (1993)

(discussing the role of HOLC and FHA discrimination in the construction and
maintenance of the black ghetto).
Though redlining and housing discrimination became "illegal" by the Fair
Housing Act of 1968, the effects continue in insidious ways. Seegeneralty Margalynne
Armstrong, Race and Property Values in Entrenched Segregation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1051
(1998).
13. Take for example the enforcement of drug laws:
The nation's war on drugs unfairly targets African Americans, who are far
more likely to be imprisoned for drug offenses than whites, even though far
more whites use illegal drugs than blacks, according to a new report by the
advocacy group Human Rights Watch....
These disparities exist even though data gathered by the Department of
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find the resolution of these matters more profound precisely because
their impropriety is not so readily apparent.
Professor Safranek concedes that "those who continue to
discriminate because of race in their conduct, through subtle and not so
subtle means, will be able to do so.''4 Unfortunately this statement
assumes that the public/private distinction is more meaningful than it
is. Of course state action is of considerable significance in
Constitutional interpretation. Nonetheless, it is also true that private
individuals comprise the state in all of its functions and bring their
individual biases with them, and it is the case that the government
enforces, or chooses not to enforce, the actions or inactions of one or
more parties within a given "private" dispute." It is true that changing
the "hearts and minds" of individuals within society is where we will
affect the greatest change, but it is also the case that this will have the
greatest impact on how the laws are written, interpreted and enforced.
Health and Human Services show that in 1991, 1992 and 1993, about five
times as many whites had used cocaine than blacks....
Michael A. Fletcher, Report. War On Drugs Sends Blacks To Prison,WASH. POST, June 8,
2000, at Al0. African Americans constitute approximately 13% of the U.S. population
and 13% of its drug users; however, African Americans constitute 35% of drug arrests,
55% of drug convictions, and 74% of drug imprisonments. See Ira Glasser, American
Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow (1999 Edward C. Sobota Lecture), 63 ALB. L. REv. 703, 719
(2000) (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
14 (1999)); see also Lisa Walter, EradicatingRadalSteroyping From Terry Stops: The Case
for an EqualProtectionExclusionar Rule, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 255,258 (2000) ("The antidrug crusade, which has served as a useful political vehicle to rally support against the
problem of crime in the inner cities-a problem in the eyes of society at large-primarily
involves racial minorities.").
Also consider the statistical disparities surrounding the use of the death
penalty concerning not only those who are executed, but all those for whom this form
of "justice" is deemed required. See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race,
CapitalPunishment,and the Supreme Court,101 HARv. L. REv. 1388, 1391 (1988) (noting
that based on empirical research on race and capital sentencing, the state places a
higher value on the lives of whites than blacks). See also infra note 19.
14. Safranek, supra note 7, at 1059.
15. "[I]f enforcement of discriminatory covenants is state action, then the private
sphere 'disappears,' since all private arrangements are dependent for their structure on
enforcement of private law ground rules." Duncan Kennedy, Freedom andConstraintin
Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenolog of Judging, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 541 (1986)
(citing Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)); see also Steven L. Winter, Transcendental
Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, andthe Cognitive StakesforLaw, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105,
1198 n.320 and accompanying text (1989).
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Some of the issues we still need to grapple with include disparities in
policing, especially regarding racial profiling 6 and police brutality,"
disparities in drug enforcement, both in the law as written and as
enforced," disparities in victim and perpetrator valuation from capital
punishment and disparities in health care.' 9
16. Racial profiling is prevalent in current society. See, e.g.,
IRA GLASSER, 30-SUM
BRIEF 30 (2001); Ren6 Bowser, RadalProfilingin Health Care.An InstitulionalAna-sisof
MedicalTreatment Disparities,7 MICH.J. RACE & L. 79 (2001); Frank Rudy Cooper, The
Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiing and
Arzizu, 47 VILL.L.REV. 851 (2002); Gregory M. Lipper, RacialProfiing38 HARv.J. ON
LEGIS. 551 (2001); Katheryn K Russell, 'Driving Whik Black" Corollaty Phenomena and
CollateralConsequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 717, 725 n.31 (1999); DJ Silton, U.S. Prisons and
RacialProfiling:A Covert RacistNation Rides a Vicious Cyck, 20 LAW & INEQ. 53, 54 n. 11
(2002) (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT
2000: EVENTS OF 1999 at 393 (2000)).
17. According to Amnesty International:
Throughout the USA people are being injured and even killed by police using
excessive force or deliberately brutal treatment. Police officers are punching,
kicking, beating and shooting people who pose no threat, or are causing
serious injuries, and sometimes death, by misusing restraints, chemical sprays
or electro-shock weapons. Most reported incidents take place during arrest,
searches, traffic stops or in street incidents.
Rights for All: Amnesty International's Campaign on the United States of America,
Race Rights and Police Brutality in the United States of America (Sept. 21, 1999),
availableathttp://www.amnestyusa.org/rightsforall/ police (last visitedJan. 29,2003).
18. See supra note 12. See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Women and Aids-Radsm,
Sexism, and Clasism, 17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 351 (1989/90); Vemellia R.
Randall, Racist Health Care: Rforming an Unjust Health Care System to Meet the Needs of
African-Americans, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 127 (1993); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Nature of
Blacks SkepticsmAbout Genetic Testing, 27 SETON HALLL. REV. 971 (1997); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Punishing DrugAddias Who Have Babies: Women of Color,Equaiky, and the Right
of Privaly, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419 (1991).
19. See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination,Death and DeniaL"The Tolerance of Racial
Discriminationin In'faion of Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 433, 434 (1995)
("Although African-Americans are the victims in half of the murders that occur each
year in the United States, eighty-five percent of the condemned were sentenced to
death for murders of white persons." (citations omitted)); see general# Erwin
Chemerinsky, EliminatingDiscriminationinAdministeringthe Death Penaly: The Needfor the
RacialJusticeAct, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519 (1995).
A disturbing case on this point is the atypical capital sentencing ofJohn William
King in the Jasper, Texas murder of James Byrd Jr. It took the brutal killing of Mr.
Byrd by King and friends chaining him by his ankles to the back of their pick-up truck
and dragging him three miles for such a sentence to be imposed. See Rick Lyman, Texas
Jug Picks Death Sentence in FatalDragingof a Black Man, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at
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Both Professor Safranek and Professor Torres touch on Affirmative
Action, but each have a different approach to the topic. Professor
Safranek believes that we are at the point where reasonable minds
interested in the elimination of racial discrimination can disagree as to
the most appropriate means of reaching that goal. Professor Tortes
characterizes it as almost a guise covering the common interests of the
relevant parties, regardless of race, the revelation of which could lead to
justice, racial and otherwise. This characterization was a lead-in for
Professor Torres' ideas for finding solutions to racial conflicts.2'
Professor Torres, in his remarks, discussed the ideas captured in his
book, The Miner's Canary, co-authored with Professor Lani Guinier. He
first provided the framework for their central ideas for using "Political
Race"'" as a transformative tool within democracy, to "explore how
racialized identities may be put to service to achieve social change
through democratic renewal."' He described their project as one within
the school of magical realism, giving voice to future possibilities.'
Professor Tortes grounded his discussion using the stories of grassroots
mobilization provided in the third chapter of his book. He focused
primarily on the stories that led to the "Texas 10 Percent Plan,"24 a plan
supported by cross-racial coalitions that ended up benefitting racial
minorities and also all other Texans throughout the state.2"
The Texas 10 Percent Plan formed in response to the Hopwood
decision.2 6 Coalitions, comprised of activists, legislators, academics, and
others from around the state, formed to "resist the resegregation of
Texas higher education."27 The resistance efforts were initiated by
people of color, but as it was revealed that university admissions were
based on criteria closely correlated with economic wealth, it became
clear that it was not only people of color who were disadvantaged by
Al (pointing out that this sentencing was only the second of a White for killing a Black
since 1850 in Texas). See also supranote 12.
20. Professor Torres' ideas for finding solutions were not limited to race, but were
intended to be useful in many kinds of conflicts, including those of gender, class, and
sexuality, among others.
21. GUINIER & ToRREs, supra note 4, at 11-31.
22. Id. at 11.
23. Id at 22-25
24. Id at 72.
25. See id at 67-82.
26. Id at 67-68 (citing Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996)).
27. Id at 68.
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traditional admissions standards.2"
In the Texas 10 Percent Plan, the solutions were ones that changed
the landscape, the definitions, and the rules of the game from the
bottom up, from common interests across the community reflected in
legislative efforts and not from the top down in legal pronouncements.
The coalitions formed essentially confirmed Derrick Bell's interest
convergence theory.29
Professor Torres also discussed racial hierarchies as exhibited by the
delineation of jobs in any given slaughterhouse.3" This sparked some
audience discussion about how some labor and employment problems
experienced by racial minorities have served as the impetus for labor
initiative and change that benefit all workers in a given industry.3 The
consistent thread in these ideas is that meeting the needs of the most
subordinated can serve the needs of the greater society.
The ideas presented by Professor Torres are very seductive, but I
nonetheless have some cynical reservations. In The Miner'sCanary, while
the authors call for racial group identification-most strongly associated
with the black plight, they also acknowledge that the current racial
hierarchy and political power are distributed asymmetrically." They
focus primarily on creating coalitions of people with common interests
beyond race as a means of finding solutions to common problems. By
definition, these are people with a need, or otherwise, with something
to gain. Thus, common interests can be found in any given situation; the
real challenge is in maintaining coalitions across a variety of situations
and across time. These coalitions can and do work, as they
demonstrated with the Texas 10 Percent Plan and the road to it.
However, Professors Guinier and Torres also acknowledge, as Frank
Michelman put it: "in a winner-take-all society there is a strong
resistance to being on the bottom. People in a position to keep
someone beneath them will do so-including other people in their same
28. Id at 68-71.
29. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-ConvergenceDikmma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980); see also GUINIER & ToRRES,
supra note 4, at 36.
30. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 4, at 74-76 (discussing the expos6 by Charles

LeDuff, At a Slaughterhouse Some Things Never Die: Who Klls, Who Cuts, Who Bosses Can
Depend on Race, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2000, at Al, A24).
31. See id. at 77-79.

32. Id. at 86.
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racial group."33 It is all well and good to repair fissures within
communities of common interest,34 referred to as "those in the mines,"
but what about convincing the holders of powers, perhaps known as the
"mine owners," whose primary interest, irrespective of common interest
with others, is to maintain and increase such power? Though I believe
the proposed solutions are workable, perhaps some of the best hope we
have, I also understand it will take a lot of work along with a little luck.
CODA: Before I finished writing this comment I had the
pleasure of hearing Professor Lani Guinier speak at the
inaugural lecture of the Damon J. Keith collection of African
American Legal History at Wayne State University. Thus, I was
able to benefit from the personal insights and explanations of
both authors of The Miner'sCanary. These interactions increased
my regard for their work and helped me come to the realization
that even though we may not be able to convince those at the
very tops of the relative power hierarchies to "share power," if
everyone else can see their common interests and find new
solutions, then those at the top will end up on the margins and
,perhaps then see a change in their interests. Collaborative
efforts could work for a more meaningful and inclusive form of
equity and justice. It will just take a lot of work.
Normally, I would write a conclusion at this point, but that seems
too final for this Symposium. I prefer to regard this as part of the
continuum of hope. My criticisms and cynicisms to the contrary, in
addition to many other efforts, it is symposia like this that seriously
consider our history and the promise of solutions and renewal that give
hope for developing awareness, understanding, and ultimately justice.

33. Id at 85 (quoting Comments at the Fifth Annual Derrick Bell Lecture, New
York University Law School, Nov. 10, 2000).
34. Id at 86

